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Abstract:
This paper describes PyBNEq - a tool for computing Bayes-Nash equilibria for games
of incomplete information. It is implemented in Python and has a graphical user
interface, allowing the user to load/save/edit game data, and to ﬁnd Bayes-Nash
equilibria. Currently, PyBNEq implements Porter-Nudelman-Shoham algorithm for
2-player games and can be considered as a decision support system for solving games
of incomplete information.
Keywords: Bayes-Nash equilibrium, decision support systems, game with incom-
plete information.
1 Introduction
Many real-world problems, including ones which contain germs of a crisis, are modeled as
games of incomplete information. Examples include market competition, currency attacks, bank
runs, liquidity crises, as well as military conﬂicts.
This paper describes a tool for computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium for games with incomplete
information. It is structured in 5 sections, as follows. After this introductory section, the section
2 introduces the Bayesian games and a short discussion related to the computation of the Bayes-
Nash equilibria. Section 3 describes the PyBNEq tool, especially its graphical user interface,
while section 4 presents some case studies we used to test our tool. Finally, the last section
compares our application with the existing ones and presents the future developments.
2 Theoretical background
In what follows, we consider the deﬁnition of a Bayesian game given in [1]. Such a game is
deﬁned as a tuple (N , A, , 
, u), where:
 N = f1; :::; ng is the set of agents or players;
 A = (A1; A2;    ; An) is the set of agents’ actions, Ai being the set of actions available to
agent i;
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  = (1;2;    ;n), with i = (i;1; i;2;    ; i;mi) being the set of types for agent i and
i;j the j-th type of agent i;
 
 = (
1;
2;    ;
n), with 
i = (!i;1; !i;2;    ; !i;mi) being the set of probabilities as-
signed to the types of agent i and !i;j the probability assigned to i;j ;
 u = (u1; u2;    ; un) is the set of utility (payoﬀ) functions, with ui = (ui;1; ui;2;    ; ui;mi)
being the set of utility functions of agent i and ui;j the utility function of i;j whose
arguments are the joint action a = (a1; a2;    ; an) and the other agents’ types  i =
(1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; n).
Alternative deﬁnitions can be found for example in [3,8,9]. The solution of a Bayesian game
is based on the concept of Bayes-Nash equilibrium. It is known that the computation of this
equilibrium is NP-complete, and the usual approach uses two steps [12]:
1. reduce the Bayesian game to a complete-information game, and
2. compute the Nash equilibrium for the complete-information game obtained in Step 1.
Step 1 above can be addressed in several ways. The paper by Ceppi et al. [1] contains a
detailed discussion regarding the ways of performing reduction, based especially on the material
in [5]. Our approach is based on the use of sequence form, due to the smaller payoﬀ matrixes
than the ones in normal form.
Step 2 means computing of the Nash equilibria for two-player complete-information games.
Ceppi et al. paper [1] analyze three algorithms for such games in strategic form: Lemke-Howson
(LH), Porter-Nudelman-Shoham (PNS), and Sandholm-Gilpin-Conitzer (SGC), and propose an
extension of PNS to Bayesian games (B-PNS), which is implemented in our tool.
The B-PNS algorithm has the following generic steps:
1. enumerate all the possible joint supports;
2. select a support for each possible type of agent 1;
3. prune the spaces of actions of the agent 2’s types by strict conditional dominance;
4. check the strict conditional dominance on agent 1’s support;
5. select a support for each possible type of agent 2;
6. check the strict conditional dominance on agent 2’s suport;
7. check the feasibility problem.
3 The PyBNEq tool
In order to implement the B-PNS algorithm, there were two interrelated design problems
to solve: data representation and the individual algorithms for each step. A future paper will
describe the design solutions in greater detail.
The implementation language is Python 2.7 [11], while data representation and numerical
computation capabilities of numpy package [6] were extensively used. Also, the application makes
use of pycplex library [13], a Python interface to the ILOG CPLEX Callable Library [2], for
solving the feasibility problem (step 7 of the above-described B-PNS algorithm). Finally, the
graphical user interface was produced by using the wxPython toolkit [14].
The application is designed with a friendly user interface, having the following components:
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 main window contains a menu bar for creating, loading or saving a game and also for
running it. When a game is loaded, this window becomes the current game window, where
the game parameters are displayed (see Figure 1), and the Bayes-Nash echilibria can then
be computed;
 new game window, allowing the user to deﬁne actions, types and probabilities for both
players (see Figure 2);
 payoﬀs window, where the payoﬀs could be added or edited (Figure 3).
Figure 1: The main window of the application
The input data are stored in /data sub-directory in .dat ﬁles. The structure of input data
ﬁle is:
Line1: ﬁrst agent’s index
Line2: ﬁrst agent’s actions
Line3: ﬁrst agent’s types
Line4: ﬁrst agent’s probabilities
Line5: second agent’s index
Line6: second agent’s actions
Line7: second agent’s types
Line8: second agent’s probabilities
Line9 and below: the payoﬀs of the two players
The result consists of the computed Bayes-Nash equilibria and it’s saved in /output sub-
directory, in an .out ﬁle. It represents the strategies proﬁle.
4 Case studies
We tested our tool with three examples of Bayesian Games: market entry game (see [7]), gift
game (see [4], and the example game from [1]. All examples consider two players, whose actions
are denoted by ai and bj , respectively.
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Figure 2: The Add new game window
Figure 3: The payoﬀs window
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4.1 Market entry game
Both players have a single type. The following payoﬀ matrix represents the input data:
b1 b2
a1 -14 , -
1
4
3
4 , 0
a2 0, 14
1
2 , 0
a3 -14 ,
1
4
1
4 , 0
a4 0, 34 0, 0
The application outputs three solutions: (a1; b2), (a2; b1), and (a4; b1).
4.2 Gift giving game
Player 1 has two types (1;1; 1;2), and player 2 has one type (2;1). Type 1;1 means p > 12 ,
while 1;2 means p < 12 . The input data are represented by the following payoﬀ matrix:
b1 b2
a1 0, 0 0, 0
a2 1 - p, p - 1 p - 1, 0
a3 p, p -p, 0
a4 1, 2  p - 1 -1, 0
a) The type combination (1;1; 2;1). Player 1 is more likely to be a friend (p > 12); the
application outputs two solutions: (a1; b2) and (a4; b1).
b) The type combination (1;2; 2;1). Player 1 is more likely to be an enemy (p < 12); the
application outputs one solution: (a1; b2).
4.3 Third example: the game from [1]
Player 1 has one type (1;1) and player 2 has three types (2;1; 2;2; 2;3). There are three
payoﬀ matrices as input, corresponding to the combinations of players’ types:
a) (1;1, 2;1): !2;1 = 12
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
a1 0, 2 4, 0 2, 5 3, 2 5, 5
a2 0, 0 5, 0 1, 8 1, 1 2, 3
a3 6, 7 3, 1 2, 6 5, 3 1, 2
a4 0, 0 2, 4 4, 1 3, 5 2, 8
a5 0, 3 5, 0 4, 3 5, 9 3, 3
The solutions are: (a1; b5), (a2; b1), and (a3; b4).
b) (1;1, 2;2): !2;2 = 14
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
a1 2, 2 0, 5 2, 5 3, 0 5, 5
a2 3, 0 0, 6 1, 8 1, 0 2, 3
a3 4, 7 6, 6 2, 6 5, 1 1, 2
a4 4, 0 0, 4 4, 1 3, 4 2, 8
a5 2, 3 0, 0 4, 3 5, 0 3, 3
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The solutions are: (a1; b3), (a2; b1), (a4; b5), and (a5; b1).
c) (1;1, 2;3): !2;3 = 14
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
a1 2, 2 4, 5 0, 5 3, 2 5, 0
a2 3, 0 5, 6 0, 8 1, 1 2, 0
a3 4, 7 3, 6 6, 6 5, 3 1, 1
a4 4, 0 2, 4 0, 1 3, 5 2, 4
a5 2, 3 5, 0 0, 3 5, 9 3, 0
The solutions are: (a2; b2), (a3; b2), (a3; b1), (a4; b5), and (a5; b4).
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we described a tool for computing Bayes-Nash equilibrium for two-player games
of incomplete information.
The authors of [1] implemented a C version of the B-PNS algorithm, while we selected Python
as the implementation language due to its beneﬁts as rapid application development by using
Component-based Software Development and the powerful libraries like numpy, pycplex, as well
as the Graphical User Interface toolkit wxPython. The graphical user interface allows a very
convenient way of playing with such games.
In the future we would like to extend the tool functionalities so that it can easely be integrated
in more elaborate decision support systems, including custom-made GUIs for diﬀerent classes
of games. Also, the application programming interface will be improved and the tool will fully
support games generated by the common generators like GAMUT.
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